

Existential Awakening in the Technocracy: Kierkegaard and the Therapy of a Heterogeneous Subject

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Abstract

This article examines the thought of Søren Kierkegaard as a form of "existential therapy" in the context of modern society facing crises of morality, identity, and individual freedom. Instead of building a closed philosophical system, Kierkegaard deploys an indirect communication strategy and a polyphonic writing form to break the homogenization of the modern rational subject. He does not reinforce the self as a sensible center – capable of representing or possessing knowledge – but rather exposes human existence's incompleteness, fragmentation, and paradox. According to Kierkegaard, existential therapy does not aim to satisfy needs or rehabilitation. Still, it is a process of awakening the ethical possibility in the individual – where truth cannot be handed over. Still, it only appears in living, self-questioning, and taking responsibility. The article develops pairs of opposing categories, such as necessity – freedom means-ends, and self-possession – other-possession - to highlight Kierkegaard's existential therapy's transformative and critical nature. Through this, the study contributes to rereading Kierkegaard as a multi-layered existentialist philosopher. It suggests a critical ethical model capable of dialogue with the problems of the technocratic era, globalization, and the crisis of subjectivity in the 21st century.

Keywords: Kierkegaard, existential therapy, subjectivity, indirect communication, critical philosophy.

JEL Classification: K10, K30

1. Introduction

The article raises profound and urgent issues of existential philosophy in the context of modern society through a new reading of Søren Kierkegaard – as an "ethical therapy" for the era of crisis. In a world dominated by technocratic systems, markets, and homogenizing structures called freedom, democracy, or development, Kierkegaard is presented as a philosophical seismic point. This existential counterforce can reveal moral paradoxes and awaken the capacity for resistance from within each individual. The core issue that the article raises is the alienation of the individual in modern mechanisms, where freedom is commodified, truth is reduced to an intellectual product, and the individual is dissolved in the crowd as an entity controlled by institutions, money, and media. In this situation, Kierkegaard does not build a system of salvation but opens up the possibility of ethical living as a creative act – aiming at no goal other than conscious and responsible existence.

The article develops two main arguments: (1) Ideological labor as a form of therapeutic communication, aiming to reposition the individual about truth and others; (2) The subject as an existential possibility that can overcome identification to become itself. Through this, the article contributes to rereading Kierkegaard in a new light. It

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suggests an ethical model capable of deep dialogue with the problems of the AI era, globalization, and the crisis of meaning in life.

2. Overview of the research situation

Søren Kierkegaard is one of the most influential thinkers in the history of modern philosophy, especially in the fields of existential philosophy, theology, psychology, and critical theory. Since the second half of the twentieth century, interest in Kierkegaard has moved beyond the traditional framework of religious analysis or individualism. It has expanded to include interdisciplinary approaches such as existential therapy, moral philosophy, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, and critique of modern social institutions.

One important trend is to read Kierkegaard as a thinker of indivisible subjectivity, in which the individual is no longer understood as a fixed entity but as a contradictory process between instinct and creativity, between freedom and necessity. MacIntyre and Taylor have emphasized Kierkegaard as a radical reaction to Kantian and Hegelian ethical rationalism and have seen him as a thinker who laid the foundations for existential and postmodern theories of personal identity.²

Niels Thulstrup was one of the first scholars to reposition Kierkegaard as a “paradoxical complex” rather than a system of thought.³ From there, a series of studies by Mackey, Westphal, and Ferreira showed that polyphonic writing, indirect communication, and Kierkegaard’s use of anonymous characters were philosophical strategies to disrupt the traditional notion of truth as something that can be handed over, possessed, or represented.⁴

There has been a recent surge in interdisciplinary approaches, particularly at the intersection between Kierkegaard and existential psychology. Yalom sees Kierkegaard as one of the first to propose a therapeutic model based not on technique but on the possibility of “existential generative” — where the therapist does not provide solutions but clarifies the relationship between the individual and themselves.⁵ Comparisons with Freud — as suggested by Jaspers and Marino — also highlight the deep connection between the fragmented dynamics of the human psyche and Kierkegaard’s critique of the self.⁶ In the field of philosophy of religion and ethics, many studies have affirmed that Kierkegaard opened up a new understanding of religion — not as a system of beliefs,

² Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984); Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).

³ Niels Thulstrup, *Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel*, trans. George L. Stengren (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980).

⁴ Louis Mackey, *Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971); Merold Westphal, *Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1996); Merold Westphal, “Kierkegaard and the Anxiety of Authorship,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 34, no. 1 (1994): 5–22, <https://doi.org/10.5840/ipq.199434158>; M. Jamie Ferreira, *Love’s Grateful Striving: A Commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁵ Irvin D. Yalom, *Existential Psychotherapy* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).

⁶ Karl Jaspers, *Socrates, Buddha, Confucius, Jesus: The Paradigmatic Individuals*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1962); Gordon Marino, ed., *Basic Writings of Existentialism* (New York: Modern Library, 2004).

but as a moral paradox, a risky choice not justifiable by objective reason.⁷ Since then, he has also been considered a pioneer of critical approaches in later philosophy, from Derrida to Žižek and Critchley.⁸

Some recent scholars have extended Kierkegaard's analysis to political and institutional critique, especially in the context of globalization, technocracy, and the crisis of democracy. Sylvia Walsh has reread Kierkegaard as a dissident thinker who warned early on about the loss of subjectivity in mass society, where individual freedom is trapped within coercive structures that assume the form of rationality.⁹ From this perspective, communication is no longer a transmission of information but an ethical therapy — a rebirth of individual choice and responsibility.

In the philosophy of language and discourse, analyses by Derrida, Rudd, Westphal, and Watkin show that Kierkegaard's writing is a challenge to any desire for systematization.¹⁰ Here, language is no longer a means of expressing objective truth but becomes a place where paradoxes, internal contradictions, and the unrepresentability of the self are revealed. Therefore, knowledge is no longer a product to be possessed but an event, a critical possibility that only appears in the relationship between the subject and the truth.

The overview shows that research on Kierkegaard has been and is spreading from existential philosophy, ethics, theology, and psychotherapy to political theory and cultural criticism. This proves that he is not only a historical figure but also a living philosophical agent, capable of deep dialogue with fundamental human problems in the postmodern era - where subjectivity, freedom, ethics, and communication are increasingly being restructured by technocracy, globalization, and the technologization of spiritual life.

3. Discussion

3.1. Kierkegaard as an Existential Therapy for the Present: The Subject, Truth, and Moral Awakening in an Age of Crisis

Kierkegaard is not a thinker of a closed system but of an unstable configuration of thought – where concepts constantly shift between paradox and critique, necessity and freedom, truth as a moral event, and the system as a coercive structure. In this sense, Kierkegaard appears not as a systematic doctrine but as a philosophical earthquake, a

⁷ John D. Caputo, *Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant Reference to Deconstruction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); C. Stephen Evans, *Kierkegaard: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); George Pattison, *The Philosophy of Kierkegaard* (Chesham: Acumen, 2005).

⁸ Jacques Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Slavoj Žižek, *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (London: Verso, 2000); Slavoj Žižek, *The Parallax View* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); Simon Critchley, *The Faith of the Faithless: Experiments in Political Theology* (London: Verso, 2012).

⁹ Sylvia Walsh, *Kierkegaard: Thinking Christianly in an Existential Mode* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

¹⁰ Derrida, *The Gift of Death*; Anthony Rudd, *Kierkegaard and the Limits of the Ethical* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Westphal, "Kierkegaard and the Anxiety of Authorship"; Christopher Watkin, *Difficult Atheism: Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin Meillassoux* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011).

countervailing force at the very heart of modern thought, where every order of knowledge – from objective truth and rational authority to linguistic clarity – is questioned by profound existential tremors.

An age where freedom is often grafted onto the mechanism of domination, where ideas of development, democracy, or individual liberation function as instruments of assimilation. In this spirit, Kierkegaard is not just a thinker but an "ethical therapist," a form of existential therapy – intervening in the individual's life not by prescribing norms but by opening up the moral capacity to resist from within. He does not build a system of salvation but awakens the possibility of freedom – not as ownership, but as responsibility.

So, to read Kierkegaard today is to read him as a reverse therapy – where the treatment does not aim to solve the social problem in the institutional sense but to transform the situation into an individual possibility: the ability to live ethically in a world that operates according to the indifferent logic of the system, the market, and technocracy. The thesis developed is ideological labor as a form of therapeutic communication and the subject as an existential possibility – not withdrawing from society but resisting from within the dominant norms.

While modern thinking defines the subject as the capacity to acquire knowledge, coordinate behavior, and govern oneself according to objective standards, Kierkegaard twists the definition: the actual subject begins not with the will to control but with the capacity to be moved — a state of openness to the truth as a moral event. Truth, here, cannot be proven or possessed but requires a transformation of the self: from a being conditioned by social structures, money, and institutions to an entity that can act consciously and responsibly.

Kierkegaard criticizes a society where freedom is instrumentalized, needs are manipulated by the market, and truth is commodified as an intellectual product. In this spirit, existential therapy does not aim at satisfying needs but at awakening possibilities. It does not move from means to ends but questions the ends themselves as a structure built to direct the will without going through ethics.

Kierkegaard's diagnosis of his time – and ours – is self-forgetfulness. In a world where the individual is dissolved into the "crowd", under the pressure of the press, of Hegelian systematic philosophy, or of the idealization of objective knowledge, man no longer lives as a subject who can define himself but as a coordinated element. In this context, the self is no longer a subject of creative ability but a product of identification and control.

Thus, we can reread Kierkegaard as a thinker of inner dialogue – where existential loneliness is not a negation of communication but the fundamental condition for a genuine form of communication: communication as an ethical action. Writing under many pseudonyms, using paradoxes, contradictions, and indirect discourse, Kierkegaard does not aim to illustrate a system but to deviate from the rational paradigm, to open space for an ethical act as creativity, not as an instinctive reflex.

Here, Kierkegaard transforms the classical oppositions—instinct and creativity, means and ends, satisfaction and compulsion—to question the very foundations of modern thinking. When he declares that "Subjectivity is truth," this is not relativism but a philosophical statement: truth does not exist outside of existential life but in the vitality of the individual who dares to commit, take responsibility, and suffer for it.

From here, the subject's journey is not a path of evolution through the social ladder but a process of becoming oneself – in the ability to overcome the alienation caused by social, monetary, and technocratic knowledge homogenization. "Owning oneself" is not opposed to social morality but is the condition to avoid falling into the possession of others, falling into the polarized relationship between people through position, income, products, or fame.

Kierkegaard's existential therapy can thus be understood as an act of philosophical deconstruction – deconstructing all forms of naturalized ownership: from money to knowledge, from social roles to developmental goals – to reestablish the human being as a living subject, not as an instrument for the operation of the system. Contradictory pairs such as "money and norms", "product and subject", or "job position and income" are not just sociological problems but manifestations of the philosophical rift between the possessed self and the self capable of moral self-control. And suppose Kierkegaard's thought still holds value in the age of AI and automation. In that case, it is his wake-up call: to live as a subject who can take responsibility for his existence – not as an instrument for producing knowledge, products, or emotions, but as a moral possibility constantly transforming itself. There, freedom is no longer the mask of social necessity but the necessity of a free life established from within the moral will – not from externally assumed structures.

3.2. Kierkegaard and Existential Reduction: Reshaping the Subject in Historical-Ethical Interaction

In Kierkegaard, we encounter a complex model of man — not as an abstract entity but as an existential process constantly torn between necessity and freedom, instinct and creativity, institutionalized passivity, and the ability to determine morality for oneself. In this contradiction, Kierkegaard has formed a reverse method of thinking: instead of reducing man to social settings, he starts from the existential crisis as a fulcrum to open up the possibility of moral freedom.

According to Kierkegaard, the existential natural attitude — also known as the state of existential reduction — is not simply a form of individual unconsciousness but a form of unreflective identification between the subject and norms, customs, and traditions. Here, the individual loses the ability to position himself, freedom is dissolved in necessity, and the survival instinct is rationalized into institutional obedience.

This reduction, however, is not a closed state but rather a preparatory point for an explosion – a qualitative transformation of the subject. It is when the imposed becomes a question, the assimilated becomes a challenge, and the possessed becomes the condition of creation. This reversal is not purely psychological but an existential and ethical movement – where will and knowledge begin to reunite as a self-determined possibility.

According to Kierkegaard, the ultimate limit of existential reduction is expressed in primitiveness and innocence. These are not psychological characteristics but forms of existence that have not yet been "activated" existentially – states in which the human being has not yet become a reflective and responsible subject. In the collision with these limits, the fundamental question of humanity arises: What does it mean to be human? And further: Am I – and you – really human?

Being human is no longer understood as a biological state or a sociological status but as an ethical act, a creation of freedom. Here, the will is no longer opposed to knowledge but crystallizes in a capacity for self-determination, a capacity to transcend the norms that have solidified into institutions. Thus, according to Kierkegaard, the ethical attitude does not arise from obedience but from awakening – a vital existential revision where the individual owns himself and is also responsible for others, the community, and history.

According to Kierkegaard, the key is not to understand existence as a closed series of internal reactions but as a form of indirect communication. During this intersubjective interaction, the self can only be restored in relation to the other. Returning to oneself is, therefore, not an egoistic act but an ethical practice — open to history, open to the other, and bound up with the politics of existence.

The indirect method of communication that Kierkegaard proposes is not intended to transmit truth as an axiom but to create the conditions for truth to be reborn from within the recipient. It is a spiritual birth therapy – an act of "intellectual midwifery" in which the interlocutor is not conditioned by external knowledge but is liberated to examine himself. Knowledge, here, is no longer a means of control but becomes the environment of ethical freedom.

If this existential therapy is successful, the result will be a restoration of the subject: the individual is no longer positioned by circumstances but begins to shape circumstances through self-determination. The relationship between self-possession and social responsibility is thus reestablished as a balance between freedom and constraint — between creative power and the limits of historical practice.

Kierkegaard calls this the present: not a moment in time but a decisive moment, where the reversal between truth and falsehood, between custom and moral choice, takes place. In this sense, the present is where reason is stripped of its primacy and gives way to the inevitable risk of existential freedom. At this point, the modern subject — as a centralized, autonomous, unitary model — begins to disintegrate.

Kierkegaard's profound critique does not consist in denying the subject but in problematizing it — placing it within the contradiction between individuality and history, between creative power and institutional limits, and between self-possession and other possessions. It is no longer the Enlightenment model of the autonomous individual but a complex, open, contradictory subject, both necessary and possible, vital and threatened.

Through his own form of authorship, he has shaken up the model of the modern subject. Specifically, it is the strategy of self-positioning as a multi-layered, anonymous, role-playing author, aiming to break the fixity of the ego and the nature of the existential therapeutic process built on the interaction between the "existential midwife" and the interlocutor. This relationship does not aim at reestablishing the ego but at dissolving it as a means, thereby restoring freedom as an end.

3.3. Kierkegaard's self-positioning: Authorial strategy and the form of existential communication

Kierkegaard's self-positioning as an author is not only a matter of personal style or technique but also of a highly reflexive philosophical structure, marking a rejection

of the model of the rational subject established by the Enlightenment tradition. In contrast to Kant or Habermas – who choose to directly announce their position as a manifesto of universal reason – Kierkegaard deploys a reverse communicative strategy: he obscures himself as a center of knowledge, establishing instead a multi-layered communicative space where the "author" is a shifting structure, constantly retreating to make room for different possibilities of truth.

According to Kierkegaard, a total understanding of my work as an author also requires understanding my own personal existence. This is not simply a biographical confession but a declaration of the inseparable connection between writing and living – where knowledge is no longer the object produced but a phenomenon of communication. In this internal therapeutic process, the author is both creator and sufferer, subject and carrier.

The authorial strategy that Kierkegaard constructs is not simply a polyphonic literary one but an existential tactical arrangement – where elements such as instinct and creativity, need and capacity, will and knowledge, satisfaction and compulsion are constantly reversed and repositioned. In this structure, the subject is no longer the possessor of knowledge but the place where knowledge is summoned through conflict – between the self and the other, between social necessity and individual freedom, between the sought-after truth and the ever-threatening falsehood. According to him, it does not summarize a system but disrupts every attempt at systematization by questioning the conditions of truth and subjecthood. The "unity" that the work brings about is not an ideological unification but a reference to an existential task: to reposition the individual about history, to society, to himself – as a contradictory presence, both bound by institutions (religious, moral, economic, political) and capable of escaping them through self-constructive behavior.

Here, the author is no longer the starting point of truth – as in the classical power-knowledge structure – but a "vortex" in the flow between means and ends, between product and subject, between possessing oneself and the risk of being possessed by others. Kierkegaard reverses the modern epistemological process: it is not the man who must adapt to universal truth, but the truth – if it exists – must be born in the imperfect and painful response of the particular subject.

This also means that knowledge is no longer something to be possessed but must be revealed through responsible communication. Truth, therefore, is no longer a stable content but an event – an "ethical phenomenon" – where the subject must constantly answer to himself and others for its presence. Here, communication is no longer a transmission of information but an act of "existential midwifery" – where each reader is not asked to agree but invited to enter a process of self-questioning, where they must re-examine the problem of their position, choice, and responsibility in the social, economic, political and spiritual structure. From this perspective, Kierkegaard is no longer simply a theologian or philosopher but an interdisciplinary critic – who establishes a form of communication that does not aim to identify or norm but to shake and awaken. He does not create a system but sets the conditions for the self-operation of the subject – a subject that is not closed in its integrity but always open as a possibility, a crack between necessity and freedom, between ownership and differentiation, between the product and the person who makes the product.

For this reason, the role of the "author" in Kierkegaard is not understood as the

ultimate symbolic power but as a structure of retreat – like a tactical formation that does not aim to capture the target but to surround it, to force it to reveal itself and speak for itself. Knowledge here is not the reward of control but the result of a continuous act of response, where the subject – in its own imperfection and finitude – becomes the place where truth can be expressed.

On the other hand, the refusal to systematize does not mean chaos. Kierkegaard is not against knowledge but against the falsehood of knowledge framed as a commodity – where truth becomes a product that can be valued, exchanged, and possessed like money. He is against the reduction of man to "job position," of knowledge to "income," and of communication to "propaganda." He demands a return to a form of existence where communication is a means of freedom, not an instrument of coercion, and truth is an act of living, not a symbolic commodity.

In this spirit, Kierkegaard's authorial strategy is one of constantly disrupting the stability of roles, functions, and norms – to open up the possibility of a different human being: not shaped by the system but daring to live in a state of constant reshaping of himself – a human being who knows how to suffer, create, respond, and love. This is also where his philosophy touches the foundation of the modern problem: how can man, amid globalization, automation, and institutionalization, still maintain his status as a free subject capable of creating meaning and responsibility?

3.4. Existential Therapy in Kierkegaard: Subject, Paradox, and the Critical Possibility of the Unrepresentable

Kierkegaard's existential therapy cannot be understood as restoring inner stability according to the logic of linear causality or classical ontological identity. On the contrary, it operates as a process of fundamental reversal – where it is not the full presence of the subject that is consolidated, but the absence, fragmentation, and paradox of the self that becomes the condition for critical therapy. Kierkegaard does not aim at representing the self as a stable center of will or reason but instead interrogates the self as an unfinished possibility, always in tension between freedom and necessity, between the creative will and the instinct of escape, between the desire to possess oneself and the falling away from oneself.

In this, existential therapy is not a tool for satisfying the need for recovery but a self-limitation of discursive power, where communication is no longer a technique for transmitting knowledge. Still, it becomes a means of withdrawal, a strategy for emptying the power of the therapeutic subject. Indirect communication – characterized by metaphor, allegory, and paradox – is Kierkegaard's way of deconstructing the therapeutic relationship as a relationship of possession. The guide does not possess the other as an object to be healed. Still, it activates the other's existential capacity by withdrawing from the role of imposition, opening up the possibility of autonomous criticism. According to Kierkegaard, the opposition between means and ends in therapy is eliminated. The process does not aim at an external goal such as "healing". Still, it opens up a possibility of self-presentation – not as a product to be possessed, but as an unfinished relationship with oneself. Here, the compulsion for the sake of the goal is replaced by the freedom of possibility, where norms and content are no longer imposed from the outside but arise from the internal relationship between the individual and himself – mediated through the

other.

Therefore, existential therapy in Kierkegaard does not accept a clear division between the therapeutic subject and the treated object. Both are caught up in a process of self-deconstruction, where the possibility of truth is no longer in the hands of the knower but requires the exposure of one's imperfection and paradox. Here, possessing oneself is no longer the condition for treating the other, but the opposite: only by giving up the will to possess can one enter into an intersubjective relationship where both are transformed.

This puts therapy in a movement that reverses the foundations of modern philosophy of the subject. Kierkegaard does not see the self as a rational and representative center but as a process of constant self-concealment, self-differentiation, and self-deferral. The self is not a stable, identifiable existence but an indeterminate structure – where the contradiction between instinct and will, truth and falsehood, and creation and self-destruction create space for freedom. This is the unrepresentable, where human existence transcends all language and all symbols.

This analysis shows that Kierkegaard was one of the first to criticize the structure of the modern rational subject from within. Unlike Freud, who emphasized the instincts and the unconscious as the causes of psychological disorders, Kierkegaard delved deeper into the ethical-religious dimension of the will, where the struggle is not only between the instincts and the superego but between the creative will and the will to escape from itself. However, both Kierkegaard and Freud pointed out that the ego is not a homogeneous unit but a field of conflict, where therapy does not aim to restore order but reveals instability as the condition of liberation. Kierkegaard thus goes beyond the cause-effect logic of modern treatment. Pain is no longer an outcome to be explained but an invitation to self-critical and self-creative action. Therapy is not reduced to "correct interpretation" but, as Kierkegaard emphasizes, is a practice of negating the possibility of being interpreted, a confrontation with the limits of the symbol, an existential attitude that dares to live in one's own incomprehensibility.

From here, the product is no longer a stable self, and income is no longer the reward of therapy. The self becomes a possibility that is constantly constructed, where the subject is no longer tied to a position, role, or social function but is defined in an open dynamic—an unstable subject as the basis of freedom.

Existential therapy, according to Kierkegaard, is therefore not just a psychological method but a philosophy – where each individual is forced to face the impossible of identification, where all norms, money, income, professional roles, or rational representations are criticized from within, to open up an existential depth, where human existence becomes a process of transformation between instinct and creativity, between possession and renunciation, between coercion and liberation.

4. Conclusion

In a modern society facing comprehensive crises in many aspects of life – from crises of morality, identity and individual freedom to the dominance of technocratic institutions, markets and media – rereading Kierkegaard as an existential therapy has profound philosophical and social implications, even though he does not propose systematic solutions or ideal designs for society. Still, he opens up an existential realm

where the individual is invited to live as a conscious subject, always in a state of self-questioning, self-resistance, and self-transformation.

Unlike modern therapeutic approaches based on the logic of cause and effect or rehabilitation, Kierkegaard lays the foundation for an ethical-existential form of therapy. There, therapy does not aim at "healing" as a result but aims at revealing the contradiction between the self and itself, between freedom and necessity, between instinct and will, and between owning oneself and being corrupted by power structures. This is a process in which the subject is not shaped from the outside but from a risky collision with the unrepresentable in human existence.

Kierkegaard inverts the roles of knowledge, author, and truth with his indirect communication strategy, polyphonic writing form, and paradoxical discourse structure. Knowledge is no longer something to be possessed but an existential event; truth is no longer an objective content but the precarious presence of a subject capable of living and taking responsibility for himself. Therefore, Kierkegaard is not just a philosopher but a thinker whose relevance remains in the context of AI globalization – when freedom is increasingly manipulated under soft forms of domination and when humans increasingly need a moral possibility to protect themselves from the systems built-in in the name of reason. This study, therefore, not only aims to reveal the depth of Kierkegaard's thought but also proposes a different understanding of philosophy: not as a closed system of knowledge, but as a method of ethical therapy – a living space where the subject is constructed in contradiction, imperfection, and existential responsibility.

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